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THE RIGHT OF A LEGISLATURE (WITHOUT REFERENCE
TO THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN) TO CHANGE THE
LEGAL CHARACTER OF ESTATES, OR THE TITLE TO
PROPERTY, BY GENERAL OR SPECIAL ENACTMENTS.
This subject presents to our view two varieties of rights. One is
the right of an organized body of men, termed a Legislature, to
prescribe laws for a community: the other, is the right to property
of each individual of that community. The one is a conventional,
delegated right; for, however natural and necessary government
and laws may be, there is no inherent right in any particular body
of men to administer that government and make those laws. The
other is a natural, original right; for we conceive of property as
something capable of existing before society. It is immaterial
whether the "state of nature" is a fabulous or a real era-whether,
chronologically, society and government were coeval with the origin
of mankind and the origin of property, or not. Logically, and in
reason, the idea of property precedes that of government. Life
and property, are synchronous with each other in their origin,
and the primary objects with which government has to deal. In
reason, the object, cause or occasion of a thing must exist before
VOL.
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the thing itself. It is on this account that, in reason, we call the
individual right to property, a natural, original right. Reason
may also teach us that government is natural and necessary. But
it has taken centuries of experience and of reasoning to develope
the idea, which is the basis of our institutions, that the governing
power, considered as a right, exists only in the totality of those
individuals whose single, particular rights, are the occasion and
object of government. From this idea arises our doctrine of the
sovereignty of the people as the governing power, and hence the
idea that our legislators, or law-making men, exercise a delegated,
and not an original power or right.
Although our subject, by its terms, limits us to a consideration
of particular relations which these two rights, viz: the right of the
Legislature to enact laws, and the right of the individual to his
property-bear to one another, it will be useful to glance hastily at
the general relations of property to the State, and of the State to
property, under our system of government. In labyrinths of unsettled questions and conflicting opinions, axiomatic truths and
general principles are always valuable guides to lead us to the light.
Let us, at the outset, gather around us a few of these guides,
reserving for after consideration the method of their use.
As was before hinted, the genius of our institutions recognizes
the people as the source of government, recognizes individual life,
liberty and property as existing together as rights prior to government. It also recognizes the protection of these as the sole object
The State therefore rises before us in the
of government.'
important character of protector of property. But a protector
belies his name, if he have not the sinews and muscles of strength
with which to support his character. The State must have powers;
else it is a mere name, without ability to act. The body politic itself
must, therefore, in a certain. sense, have life. It must also have a
certain degree of liberty and property, in order to protect its
members in their individual life, liberty and property. Individual
liberty must be restrained, that the liberty of the whole may be
I Works of Franklin, Adams, Jefferson and Hamilton; The Federalist; Bills of
Rights of several State Constitutions, &o.
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practicable. And property itself must contribute of its fullness
for its own protection. Hamilton, in arguing the necessity of the
power of taxation, in The Federalist, remarks, that money is the
vital principle of the body politic, essential for the performance of
its functions. And we may extend the sense of the remark to all
those other powers or rights with which government must be
endowed in order to perform its office, and which, from the nature
of things, must be derived by abridging those natural powers and
rights which it is to protect. As Blackstone in effect says, a man's
civil rights are what is left of his natural rights, after he has given
up to the State what it absolutely requires. While the State,
therefore bears the relation of protector to property-property
bears the relation of a support or prop to the State.
If, in connection with this relation between property and the
State, we keep in mind the idea previously considered, viz: that,
logically, property existed before the State, and, so far as the two
are concerned, was not made for the State, but the State for it, the
right of the individual being an original right, while that of the
Legislature is delegated, we shall arrive at the true general principle that embraces all the others, to wit: that the individual right
to property is strictly sacred from all interference on the part of
the State, through its agent, the Legislature, save when the
protection of life, liberty, or of property itself, requires its exercise.
But how is this general principle derived from political ethics to
assist us ? Prima facie our subject is not proposed as a question of
civil polity or political ethics, but as a question of law. We are to
consider the limits of legislative power. These limits as determined
by the true principles of the science of government, or by the
maxims of morality and justice, form one question, while as defined
by law, they form another and a different question. Law is the
actual rule of civil conduct prescribed by the government, while the
science of government and of political ethics prescribed theoretically
what ought to be the rules of civil conduct. As patriotic citizens
and lovers of our country, we cannot but hope that under our
system of government, constructed as it was by the light of the past
experience of the world, the two are identical; just as the true
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lawyer will always desire to find law and justice synonymous. Yet
we should note carefully the distinction. We have at the outset
derived from the acknowledged theory of our government a certain
general principle. But the law under which we live, and under
which our subject arises, is not a body of general principles only,
but a definite collection of rules, actually prescribed by the sovereign
power or its agent, for the civil conduct of the members of the State.
We have, therefore, to look first at the actual law. Under our
form of government, there is a definite body of law prescribed for the
regulation of the government itself. The actual theory, objects and
principles of our government, are to be found embodied, in their leading outlines, in our several State Constitutions and the paramount
Federal Constitution. These together make up the organic, fundamental law under which we live. Thus it happens that legislative
power, unlike parliamentary authority in England, or the corresponding department in any other country, is subject to the provisions
of written constitutions.. So that, under Blackstone's general term
"9municipal law," there are comprised in this country not only
common law and statute law, but also a third peculiar department,
that of constitutional law. And since legislative power is determined
in its general outlines by the provisions of the State Constitutions
and the Federal Constitution, a question respecting its limits
becomes a constitutional question. And since the interpretation
and application of constitutional law is a function belonging to the
judiciary, such a question is a judicial question. So well settled at
the present time, and so frequently exercised, is this function of
the judiciary, that it is unnecessary to trace the rise of the power
from its first feeble exercise' in the early cases to its present mature
and universally acknowledged completeness. Our subject, therefore,
since it is primarily a question of law, and has to do with legislative
right, is a constitutional question. It is, consequently, a judicial
question-one for judicial cognizance. It is a question for legal,
and not political consideration.
I In 1792, in 2 Dallas, 409, the Court, with great tremor, pronounced a law
unconstitutional.
Cranch, 127.

But the question was settled forever by Marshall, C. J., in 1
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But while it is such, it has also the politico-ethical phase before
noticed. What is the relation between these two aspects of the
subject ? Are we, inasmuch as the question is one of constitutional
law, to stop short with the constitutional provisions, and look no
further ? Are we to avoid all'consideration of general principles
derived from political ethics or the laws of morality and justice ?
It is evident, that with a written constitution before us, as the
fundamental law, we cannot have recourse to anything extraneous
to the instrument, to any general principles whatsoever, to contradict or vary the constitution.
But can we resort to general principles when there is no repugnance between them and constitutional provisions, to determine the
rights of the legislature ?
It is plain to every one that we not only can, but must, to a certain extent. For some of the most important and usual powers of
the legislature cannot always be derived from a grant in the constitution; and when so derived it is generally by implication only.
All those powers, which are called the "sovereign powers" of the
State, such as eminent domain, the power of taxation, and of police
regulation, are considered as having their origin in general principles rather than in any distinct grant of the constitution. If a
constitution were perfectly silent as to these powers, they would be
deduced from the necessary character of a government. It is
impossible for a written instrument to enumerate all the powers to
be granted; and many of them must be inferred from the general
nature of government, or from very general terms in the constitution. A constitution is intended as a check and limitation, not as
a description of all the functions and powers of government.
"This is true as to a constitution generally like those of the States.
The federal constitution is of a peculiar character. Since the federal
government was formed by the surrender of certain powers of the
several States, its constitution confers only such powers as are
expressly given. But under the State constitutions all the power of
the people is delegated to the government, except such as is specifically reserved." '
C. J. Gibson, in Kirby vs. SIaw, 7 Harris, (Penna.,) 258.
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We must conclude, therefore, that general principles of government and of political ethics may at least confer powers or rights
upon a legislature, when there is no conflicting constitutional provision, and that many powers thus derived are recognized by the
courts as legitimate powers. As a general conclusion, we might
perhaps say that each department of government, so far as itself
alone is concerned, can draw its powers from general principles, if
they are not repugnant to constitutional provisions.
But can any department make use of these principles to restrain
another department? Can the judiciary employ them to restrain
the legislature ?
Can it add to its right of applying constitutional restrictions, the
power of applying general principles of government, or of morality
and justice, as restraintsP
This is a,question which is of great importance in this essay, and
which will warrant a rather extended consideration. Any investigation is in a great measure accomplished, when its nature and
limits are settled.
Our subject, as we have seen, involves, primarily, a legal or judicial question. Consequently, if we should determine that the judicial power embraced that of restraining the other departments by
general principles, our judicial or legal question would extend over
the wide field of universal justice and the science of government,
and become to a great degree political as well as legal. But if we
should conclude that the judicial power, as a restraint on the legislature, is confined to the application of constitutional provisions
solely, we should then have a much narrower, and a purely judicial
course to traverse.
The question, therefore, which must be determined before we can
advance further in our essay, is :
Whether legislative right or power is subject to any other restrictions, which the judicial power can enforce, than are to be found in
constitutional provisiois ?
It is to be noticed that we speak only of such restrictions outside
of the constitutions, as the courts can apply. There is a fundamental ever-existing limitation upon legislative power arising from
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the sovereignty of the people. The whole frame of government,
and the constitution itself, may be changed at any time by the
people. With this ever-abiding sovereign power of restraint, the
judiciary have nothing to do; it is itself subject to it. The establishment and recognition of a particular form of government, is a
political question, to be settled by political action, and does not
afford a basis for judicial cognizance. 1
We are considering only those restrictions which one agent of the
people, the judiciary, can enforce against another agent, the legislature, under an existing constitution endowing them with their
respective powers.
We should also notice beforehand, that there may be implied as
well as express restrictions. Implied restrictions are deduced by
interpretation. And there is a distinction between the use of
general principles for the interpretation of a constitution, and
their use as sources of new powers or restraints. Interpretation
or construction is an acknowledged function of the judiciary. There
may be cases of interpretation in which the courts, by enforcing
implied restrictions, may appear to be applying restraints derived
outside of constitutional provisions. In performing its duty of construction, the judiciary may be obliged to call to its aid general
principles of government or maxims of the common law; and in
this way legislative power may be indirectly restricted by principles
outside of the express letter of the constitution. But this species
of restriction must properly and strictly be considered as an element inhering in the expressed constitution itself; though the effect
of it, when the courts exercise their right of interpretation with
much latitude, is almost the same as endowing the constitution with
new provisions. Correctly, however, interpretation only develops
powers and principles already inhering, does not add to or enlarge
a constitution. Hence, the common law and the fundamental principles of government are an unexpressed implied part of our constitutions as an element of interpretation. They form, as it were, the
atmosphere in which our constitutions were born, and which, therefore, necessarily determine some of the conditions of their being.
17 Howard, (U. S.) 1.
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So far then as general principles interpret, they may be used by
the courts as a part of constitutional law. And under our present
subject the principle deduced from our theory of government at the
commencement of this essay may be employed to this extent at
least.
But, beyond their use in interpretation, can the general principles
of government, or those of " magna charta," or the fundamental
principles of natural justice and morality, be employed by the courts
to invalidate legislative enactments ?
How is this question to be determined?

What defines the

respective powers of the judiciary? Evidently the constitutionsso far as they are defined by written law. But the constitutions
do little more than separate the government into three departments, the executive, the judicial, and the legislative, leaving these
terms to explain themselves. Usage and judicial decisions under
these very constitutions must determine, where the written provisions are indefinite. The general writers on governments and
natural law, such as Domat, Grotius, Burlamaqui, Puffendorf, Locke,
Hooker, &c., &c., can afford us little help. At least their theories
are of less authority than usage and the adjudications of cases, or
opinions of judges under the very constitutions containing the indefinite phrase that is to be construed. Such a right in the judiciary, if included in the term "judicial power" must grow up by
usage on the part of the courts themselves, if at all-just as the
right to apply actual constitutional provisions grew up under this
general phrase. By this latter power the judiciary became more
nearly a co-ordinate branch of the government than ever before.
If it has the former power also, it is something more than co-ordinate. Indeed, the question resolves itself into one between the
claims of the two departments for supremacy. Independently of
the express letter of the constitutions, and subject to the sovereignty
of the people ; is either sovereign as to the other ? and if so, which
of the two, the legislature or the judiciary ?
In England, in a few early cases, the doctrine was announced
that there were certain principles of natural equity and of common
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right, which would of themselves invalidate an act of Parliament.'
But these cases are but exceptions to the doctrine laid down in
Blackstone and universally prevalent in England, "that the power
of Parliament is absolute and without control," 2 and even announced by Coke (at great variance with his opinion as expressed
in Bonham's case) in these words-" the power and jurisdiction of
Parliament is so transcendent and absolute that it cannot be cort3
sidered either for causes or persons within any bounds."
The doctrine of these early and exceptional English cases has
been announced in many of our American cases as applicable to
the legislature. At a very early period, an act of the legislature of
South Carolina was declared void as being against common right and
reason;4 and in another instance, as being against common right
and the principles of "magna charta." 5 In Rogers vs. Bradshaw,6
the Supreme Court of New York said that a law violating a great
and fundamental principle of government should be deemed a nullity, as against natural right and reason. In Benson vs. XMayor of
NZ'ew York, 7 Justice Barculo said, that the rights of parties rest
not merely on the constitution, but on the great principles of
eternal justice, which lie at the foundation of all free governments.
In goshen vs. Stodington,8 Justice Hosmer, of the Supreme Court
of Connecticut, said, that if there should exist a case of direct
infraction of vested rights too palpable to be questioned, and too
unjust to admit of vindication, he should not avoid considering it a
violation of the social compact and within the control of the judiciary. In Hatch vs. Vermont Central R. B. Co.,' it was said,
that a certain act of special legislation would be void upon general
principles of reason and justice. In Calder vs. Bull, 10 Justice
Chase said, that there are certain vital principles in our republican
governments which will determine and overrule an apparent and
flagrant abuse of legislative power.
'Dy vs. Savage, iobart, 85; Dr. Bonham's case, Rep. part 8, p. 118; 12
Mod. 669.
4 1 Bay. 98.
3 4 Inst. 86.
2 B1. Comm. Bk. 1, ch. 2.
5 1 Bay. 252.
6 20 Johns. 785.
7 10 Barb. 228.
92.5 Vt. 49. *
108 Dall. 386.
8 4 Conn. 209.
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These cases are sufficient to show the tendency of some courts
and some judges to hold that there are certain great principles of
right justice or government, which it is the duty of the judiciary to
apply as restraints on legislative action, independently of constitutional provisions.
But there are numerous and weighty authorities to the contrary.
Chancellor Kent' in his commentaries, after praising the early,
exceptional, English cases, and after stating that the principle of
the English government, that Parliament is omnipotent, does not
apply in this country, is, nevertheless, obliged to acknowledge that
if there be no constitutional objection to a statute, it is with us as
absolute and uncontrollable as laws flowing from the sovereign
power under any other form of government.
.In Bennet vs. Boggs,2 Justice Baldwin of the U. S. Supreme
Court said, that we cannot declare a legislative act void because it
conflicts with our opinions of policy, expediency or justice. "We
are not" said he, "the guardians of the rights of the people of the
State unless they are secured by some constitutional provisions
which come within our judicial cognizance. The remedy for unwise and oppressive legislation, within constitutional bounds, is by
an appeal to the justice and patriotism of the representatives of the
people. If this fail, the people in their sovereign capacity can
correct the evil; but courts cannot assume this right."
In Butler vs. rPamer,3 Cowen J. says that, after allowing the
restrictions to be found in the Federal and State constitutions, it is
not conceivable that any further bounds can be set to legislative
power by the courts. And in Cochrane vs. T an Surley,4 Yerplanck, Senator, says, that it affords a safe rule of construction for
courts in the interpretationof laws admitting of any doubtful construction to presume that the legislature could not have intended
an unequal and unjust operation of its statutes. But if the words
be positive and without ambiguity, no authority can be found for a
court to vacate or repeal a statute on the ground of its injustice
1 1 Bald. 74.
See also opinions of Selden & Johnson, in 2 Parker (C. C.)

1 1 Kent Com. 448, 5th edition.

1 Hill, 824.
490.
420 Wend. 381.
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alone.' So in Sharpless vs. The Mayor,2 C. J. Black said, that he
could not declare a law void because it violated the spirit of our
institutions or impaired those rights which it is the object of a free
government to protect, unless such laws are prohibited by the constitution. To do otherwise would be for the judiciary to assume
the right of changing and enlarging the constitution.
3
The same doctrine has been upheld in the courts of Missouri,
Indiana, 4 Georgia,5 and Michigan.6
The sovereignty of the Legislature, so far as the judiciary is concerned, independently of constitutional provisions, is recognized by
Justice Iredell, in Caldervs. Bull,7 by Justice Peterson in Cooper vs.
Telfair,s and by Story, in his Commentaries on the Federal Constitution.,
It has been argued that the declarations of rights prefixed to the
State Constitutions are themselves a proof of the indefinite, unlimited
and absolute power which would reside in a constituted legislative
body, unless restrained and limited by the instrument of its constitution. For what reason, it is asked, were the prohibitory articles
introduced, if, by a general grant of legislative power, the legislature would not have had authority to do the acts thereby prohibited."
And if able to do the prohibited acts unless it were constitutionally
restrained, much more is the legislature able to do those not prohibited, free from the control of the judiciary.
In deciding between these two classes of authorities, it is to be
noticed that in many of the cases, in which the right is claimed, it
is announced merely "obiter," and that in most of those in which
the decision is apparently based on general principles, the cases are
really decided on constitutional grounds, or if not, might have been.
For what are sometimes so eloquently set forth as distinct classes of
general principles underlying our institutions, and which, in these
panegyrics, are treated as something distinct from the constituI Same principle in 7 Harris (Penna.) 2.58.
2

21 Pena'a. 147-162.

15 Missouri, 3.
4 8 Blackf. 10, 5 Id. 258.
5 5 Geo. 194.
3

2 Am. Law Reg., 27.
1 Mann. 295.
7 3 Dall. 398.
8 4 Dall. 19.
6

9 3 Story Com. 1367.
1013 Am. Jurist, 75.
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tions, can generally be reached through the constitutions themselves.
For instance, the case of Taylor vs. Porter,' which is sometimes
cited as sanctioning the idea of there being restraints to be found
outside of the constitution, is based in reality on the express terms
of the constitution.2 And in other cases where the court professes
to rest its decision on general principles, it will be found that the
desired rule might by interpretation have been deduced from the
constitution. In some of the cases, also, as in 1 Bay. 98-252, the
laws declared void were passed before the existence of a constitution. There was, therefore, a good excuse for the court's resort to
general principles during the formative period, as it were, of the
constitution of the state-which would not make the cases authoritative guides for us.
Reason and authority seem to incline to that view which regards
the legislature as sovereign, outside of constitutional provisions,
the paramount sovereignty of the people excepted. Those who
advocate the duty of the courts to restrict legislative action by the
application of general principles, do so either on the ground that
the laws of nature, &c., are a part of a body of universal law, which
the courts, as courts of law, are to vindicate and enforce; or on the
ground that it is the duty of the judiciary to prevent one branch of
government becoming an arbitrary and despotic power. As to the
first point, the very impracticability of a judicial tribunal's determining those general principles, about which no half a dozen writers
are agreed, would be a sufficient answer. Principles of religion and
morality, as understood by each individual, are binding upon his
conscience. The science of government as understood by him,
should control his opinions. The most fundamental and generally
acknowledged of these principles are incorporated with our forms of
government. Now the question is, after the body politic has not
chosen to prescribe certain principles for the restraint of one of its
agents, shall another agent arrogate to itself the right to prescribe
them, when this right is not delegated to it ? These principles may
be such as are binding upon the consciences of the legislature itself,
1 4 Hill, 140.

1 See

Sedgwick on Constitutional Law, 155, note.
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and such as should govern it in relation to its own acts. Yet if it
chooses to violate them. shall the consciences of the judges of the
courts be allowed to control the legislative conscience ? The plea
that there otherwise would be no remedy against oppression and
tyranny on the part of the legislature, in some instances, is met by
the fact of the sovereignty of the people, or offset by the counter
plea that in this way there would be danger of the judiciary itself
becoming despotic.
This last point also answers the second ground of objection to the
sovereignty of the legislature, viz. : that there should be no place
open for the exercise of despotic power in a free state. Giving the
desired power to the judiciary would be simply changing the despotism from the side of the law-makers to the side of those whose
proper function it is to apply the law. The making of a law must
precede its application. An enactment of the law-making power is
to be presumed a law, unless there is some paramount law which
declares it none. Were the judiciary to declare a professed law,
emanating from the proper department, No law, aside from and
without reference to any paramount law, it would become a lawmaking power, and no longer a proper judicial tribunal.
In determining, therefore, the right of the legislature to change
the legal character of estates or the title to property, we must confine ourselves solely to constitutional provisions. Any enactment
of the legislature, general or special, which does not violate these,
is constitutional and valid. So far as we are concerned, in our
character as lawyers, such acts are of binding force. However
unjust may be any particular legislative act changing the legal
relations or the title of property, however opposed, as we may
think, to the principles of our free institutions, if it does not violate
the State or the Federal Constitution, it is not for us, as lawyers,
to pronounce it invalid. With such an act we must deal in our
capacity as citizens, and as individual members of the sovereign
people, should we desire its repeal or abrogation; but as lawyers or
judges, we could not declare it void. The discussion and application of general principles of justice and civil polity we are to leave
to statesmen and political writers, and to the legislators themselves,
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except so far as they may be necessary for the interpretation of
express constitutional provisions.
With the ground thus prepared-with the general principle that
the individual right to the property is strictly sacred from all interference on the part of the legislature, save when the protection of
life, liberty, or of property itself requires its exercise-with this
general principle as an aid to interpretation in ambiguous caseslet us inquire
What, under constitutional law, is the right of the legislature,
independently of eminent domain, to change the legal character of
estates, or the title to property, by general or special enactments ?
By the exception of "eminent domain" all questions are excluded
connected with the right of the legislature to take property for
public uses, or by way of taxation, or for purposes of police regulation. For "eminent domain" in its most general sense, includes
all these powers. "Eminent domain" expresses that sovereign
power of the State over the property of its subjects or citizens,
which must exist in the State for the public good, and which is conceded as existing by all writers and under all systems of government, and which may exist in our own governments, and will be
recognized by the courts, independently of any grant in the
constitutions. There is a narrower sense in which the phrase
is used, the same in which it is employed in the constitutional
provisions, which forbid the taking of private property for public
And the courts have carefully
use without "compensation."
property as requires "compenof
taking
a
such
distinguished
sation," from the powers of taxation and police regulation in which
no "compensation" is necessary.' They have drawn a definite line
between "eminent domain" in this restricted sense, and the taxing
and police power. Still, "eminent domain," in its most general
meaning (that which our subject has in view) includes all these
sovereign powers of the State.
Excluding these, there are left to be considered those powers of
the legislature which are generally conferred by a grant in the State
constitutions of "legislative power."
17 Cush. 58-84.

4 Comst. 423.
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The grant is made under this very general phrase. It is in some
constitutions expressed in the simple declaration that the power of
the government shall be divided into three departments-the legislative, the executive, and the judicial. In none, except that of New
Hampshire, is an attempt made to define the "legislative power,"
and here with not much success. Careful provision is made for the
separation and independence of the three departments, so that no
person exercising the functions of one shall assume or discharge the
duties of another-but without any explanation of what is to be
understood by the '' legislative power."
The legislature, therefore, by this grant has all the power over
property that can be deduced from the meaning of the term "legislative power" in its widest sense, except so far as this term is
restricted by other constitutional provisions.
What are the restrictions to be found in our constitutions ?
First-In the Federal Constitution, the only provision affecting
legislative right over property, within the sense of our subject, is
that clause, among other restraints upon ttle States, which declares
that "no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts."
Second-In our several State constitutions are to be found, in the
preambles and bills of rights, declarations of certain general principles to government, such as the equality of man and the abstract
right of life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of happiness. While
these serve as aids in interpretation, there'is to be found in the constitutions themselves the express provision that no citizen shall be
deprived of his rights, or of life, liberty or property, except by the
law of the land or by due course of law.
This provision, with the restriction implied in the separation of
the legislative from the judicial department, or expressed in the
prohibition of one department exercising the functions of the other,
make up the limitations upon legislative power over property, independently of "eminent' domain" which are common to the several
State constitutions.
It will be necessary to examine more particularly the purport of
these restrictions upon legislative power and guaranties of private

tIGHT OF LEGISLATURE

rights, that we may see how they are to be applied in the present
case. Let us examine the construction which the courts have put
upon themFirst-as to the provision of the Federal Constitution, let us
glance at
I. The meaning of the term " contract" as used in that instrument.

II. The meaning of the phrase "impairing their obligation."
1. What is a "contract" under the constitution of the United
States, in this connection ?
The Supreme Court says' that the term applies to contracts by
which perfect rights, certain definite, fixed, private rights of property are vested, and not to rights growing out of measures or

engagements, adopted or undertaken by the body politic or State
government for the benefit of all, which, from the necessity of the
case and aocording to universal understanding, are to be varied
or discontinued as the public good shall require. There is no
"contract" on the part of the State that prospective possible rights
shall not be abridged or revoked by future legislation. 2 A contract
includes executed as well as executory agreements, so that a legislative
grant is a contract. 3 Charters of private corporations are contracts.
Marriage is held a contract within the purview of the Federal Constitution in some cases, 5 and in others' as not a contract.
Of the incidents of marriage, such as are existing, vested rights,
are held contracts. 7 Dower is held an inchoate right, not the
result of a contract, but a positive institution of the State.9
We see, therefore, that " contracts," in this provision of the
Federal Constitution, embrace private agreements between indi'10 How. 416.
2 18 Barb. 159; 17 Barb. 660; 5 Barb. 474; 4 Sandf. 461.

8 6 Cranch, 87; Fletcher v. Peck.
4 4 Wheaton, 619; Dart. Coll. v. Woodward.
5 4 Wheat. 518, (obiter) ; 4 Mo. 120; 8 Conn. 548.
616 Me. 479; 7 Dana, 184 See 1 Kent, 417.
74 Barb. 296.
8 4 Selden, 110; 4 Sandf. 461.
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viduals, by which definite rights are vested, and public agreements
between an individual, or a body of individuals, and the State,
and that under the latter are not included the general laws passed
by the Legislature for the good of the community.
II.What acts "impair the obligation of contracts

?"

The peculiar distinction made by C. J. -Marshall, in Sturges vs.
Crowninshield,1 between the obligation of a contract and its remedy,
has been followed in the cases since his time. C. J. Taney, in
Bronson vs. .Kinzie,2 illustrates and maintains the doctrine. According to this distinction, all State laws, doing nothing more than
changing a remedy or altering it so as to abridge it, are constitutional. It is acknowledged, in some of the cases, that the remedy
may be altered or abridged to such an extent as to impair the obligation of the contract, and make the law unconstitutional.3
But so long as we can trace the legislative act as affecting the
remedy alone, and not the essence of the contract, it is held valid. In
this way it is held that the time under statutes of limitation may be
shortened, new rules of evidence prescribed, modes of proceedings
altered with respect to past contracts, new laws passed requiring
further legal sanction to make a title perfect, as registry, and laws
passed making valid previous invalid acts.4
Second, as to the provisions of the various State constitutions:
I. As to the distinct provision insuring to property the protection
of the "law of the land," or "the due course of law."
The definition of kIr. Webster, given in his argument. in the Dartmouth College case, is often quoted as one of the best explanations
of the term "law of the land."
"By the 'law of the land' is most clearly intended the general
law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inouiry,
L4 Wheat. 200.
21 How. 315.

See also 2 How. 608; 8 Blackf. 455.

" 1 How. 315.
43 Pet. 190; 2 How. 608; 28 Miss. 361; 8 Mass. 429; 5 Pick. 26; 22Pick-.
431; 8 Pet. 88; 18 Me. 112; 4 Greene, 154; 36 Me. 9; 1 Kernan, 281 ; 3 Kernan, 299.
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and renders judgment only after trial. The meaning is, that every
citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property and immunities under
the protection of general rules that govern society. Everything
that may pass under the form of an enactment is not the law of the
land.",
The phrase, "law of the land," in the amendments to the Federal
Constitution, though it applies solely to acts of Congress, and not
to the States, is held to be equivalent to the same provision in the
State constitutions. We may, therefore, properly consult the opinion
of Justice Curtis, given under this clause in Murray's Lessee vs.
BobokenC l He says that to ascertain whether any proceeding is
due process of law, the constitution itself is first to be examined, to
see whether any of its provisions be disregarded, and if not, then
we must look to the settled usages and modes of proceeding existing
in the common and statute law of England at the time of the emigration of our ancestors. It seems, therefore, that if an act of the
Legislature deprives a man of his property without affording him an
opportunity to have his rights adjudicated under some general law,
the act is unconstitutional, unless there are no constitutional provisions applicable to the case, and the proceeding by which the act is
done existed as a part of the legislative power under the common
law.

II. As to the separation of the legislative from the judicial
department.
Closely allied to -the position just considered is the division of the
powers of government, and their prescribed independence.
The provision just considered is but an express prohibition of, or
safeguard against, the consequences which would flow from a disregard of the independence and the inviolability of the judicial functions by the Legislature.
'Same general idea in 4 Hill, 180, J. Bronson's opinion. See also 3 Dev. 12;
10 Yerg. 59; 2 Greene's, (Iowa,) 122; 2 Texas, 251; 6 Barr, 87; 16 Penna. 256;
2 Henn. & M. 336; 4 McLean, 498; and opinions of the various judges in 3 Kernan, 378, Wynehawer vs. People.
2 18 How. 272.

TO CHANGE TITLES.

It is very difficult to draw a definite line of demarcation between
the two powers, from the difficulty of exactly defining either
power. The cases enable us to catch a few general distinctions.
It is said that the legislature is to confine itself to making laws,
and is not to make decrees determining private controversies ; that a
legislative act, as distinguished from ajudicial act, is one which determines what the law shall be for the government of all future cases,
while the latter determines what the law is in relation to some
particular thing already done or happened.'
An act, in its nature judicial, determining private controversies,
2
directly or indirectly, is to be classed among objectionable laws.
An act releasing a debtor from imprisonment for a limited time
has not the characteristics of a law, and is void. 3 General or special
acts, granting appeals after the time allowed by the law, are judicial,
and void.4 An act declaring a widow entitled to dower is judicial,
and void.5 So of an act authorizing the sale of land for the payment of debts. 6

So of acts dispensing with the law in particular

7

cases, and of acts granting new trials.8 Numerous other cases
declare acts of the legislature, in the nature of judicial decrees,
void. 9 Legislature has no right to determine facts touching the
rights of individuals, says the court in a New York case. 10 Nor has
it the right to determine the rights of parties either by itself or by
commissioners," for this is judicial.
We have now cousidered in a general way what is left within the
"legislative power," after the exclusion of the rights of eminent
domain, and have considered, also, the constitutional restrictions
that limit this remainder of power.
We are to discuss under our subject the relations of this restricted
'2 Chip. (Vt.) 77.

4

3 Vt. 507; 3 Aik. 315.

7 Metc. 389.

r 3 Scam. 465.

1 Aik. 121; 2 Vt. 175,517; 3 Vt. 361.
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Scam. 238; 10 Yerger, 59.

11 Iass. 396; 5 Pick. 65.
8 15 Penna. 18; 3 Greenl. 326; 4 ib. 140; 4 Indiana, 301.
9 5 Yerger, 320; 1 Gill. & J. 463; 18 Penna. 111 ; 8 Gi 145; 5 Indiana, 348.
10.7 Hill. 77.

125 Cowen, 346.

